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by Grace A. de Laguna 
Ferrater Mora•s thesis that philo·sophical concepts are "limiting con-
cepts,. is an assertion about thought, but it also reflects an ontological thesis 
concerning HBeing.0 In treating, or calling, concepts "limiting," Ferrater 
Mora is using a mathematical analogy although he does not accept all the 
implications of the analogy with the theory of "limits." It is. I believe, his 
position that Being is such that it cannot be exhaustively conceptualized or 
confined within the limits of a conceptual system, that it inevitably escapes 
the net of conceptual though~ however fine its meshes. In saying this, I am 
trying to express my meaning by metaphors rather than analogy, and this is 
rather significant. Ontological thinking must make use of concepts put use 
them so as to make manifest their inadequacy to the full being of what is. 
F errater Mora once criticized my notion of the individual ( as ontological) 
on the ground that the' individuar or'individuality' is a limiting concept. On 
this occasion he .argued, as I recall, that individuality was never completely 
exemplified, but only approximated in the beings we find or encounter in the 
world of our experience. This sounds like Plato and can hardly be F errater 
Mora's position for it seems to imply a sort of dualism between the realm of 
Being and the changing and indistinct realm of our human experience. He 
means, if( understand him correctly, that our concepts areulimiting/' not in 
their inadequacy to the human world, but in relation to Being. Ontologi-
cally, his position is just the opposite of Plato's, although like·Plato Ferrater 
Mora seeks to approach ~ntology through epistemology-he views Being as 
manifest in its relation to thought So,. however just his criticism of my 
notion of the individual may be, it cannot rest on a direct appeal to 
experience. He must distinguish_ both the human world from, and show its 
ontological relationship to, Being. Perhaps my own notion of the individual 
was not as clear as it might have been for I would agree that no "concept0 of 




more about a possible ontology or the individual presently. 
In saying that our philosophical concepts are "limiting concepts" 
Ferrater Mora is making use of a mathematical analogy, but I think he 
would agree that this is merely an analogy and hence inadequate to express 
his ontological understanding. For clearly since the mathematical theory or 
limits is designed to apply to the mathematical continuun1y it can be applied 
to Being only if, or insofar as, Being is itself a continuum-that is, by 
accepting the concept or the continuum as ontologically adequate or 
ultimate. But I think Ferrater Mora would agree that the concept 
~continuum' is itself, as a concept, "limiting" in the noO:.analogical sense he 
means. 
If r errater Mora means that, on the ope hand, Being is such that it cannot 
be exhaustively expressed in terms of concepts and that, on the other hand. 
our ontological thought itself is not formulatable in terms of concepts, then I 
must agree with him; although I admit that I express this meaning only by 
the use of metaphors which suggest but do not formulate philosophical 
meaning.. . 
Perhaps F errater Mora migh~ say that we have a concept of Being and 
that it is an ontological concept precisely because it is a" limiting concept0 
in that it is the "concept of the unconceptualizable"-but this is a paradox. 
Being can no more be conceptualized in negative than in positive terms. 
There can be no concept of Being because it is in some sense the source of 
conceptual thought It supplies a necessary condition for conceptualization. 
An ontological understanding of Being must include, or at least lead to, an 
ontological understanding of the individual. Or perhaps I should say that an 
ontological understanding of the individual offers an approach to an 
ontological understanding of what is. I have spoken of a "concept" of the 
individual, but there can be no concept of the individual, as there can be no 
concept of Being, for the being of an individual, as individual, must escape 
formulation in terms of concepts which are ineluctably general. One may 
·indeed conceptualize the individual, . as one may conceptualize Being, in 
negative terms, as unrepeatable, unduplicatab/e, but this leads toparad 
for the individual could not be if there were not "something rather th n 
nothing.,. We must_ moreover, understand the being of the indi idual 
positively as providing a necessary condition for conceptu liz tion. (Th r 
can be no thinking except by individuals and the concep u b 
individuals are themselves applicable to the individuals of, or t hi 
one thinks.) 
I have argued for a similarity between the ontological und 
Being and or the individual. But Beins is not to be understoo(I 
individu~ nor is an understanding or the individu I n und 
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Being. The understanding of one complements that of the other. One caMot 
understand Being in terms of concepts because it transcends all generality. 
One cannot understand the individual in general terms because it also 
~~s~ends generality ( in an opposite direction, so to speak), because the 
md1v1dual transcends the particular, i.e., it is a case or exemplification of 
the general. 
To deny the adequacy of concepts to express Being on the ground that 
concepts are "limiting," -as Ferrater Mora seems to have done, is 
misleading insofar as it relies on a mathematical analogy. Yet I think it 
represents a deeper and more penetrating insight Being cannot be 
understood as a mathematical continuum, as infinitely divisible or infinitely 
numerable but uncountable in terms of any unit of numeration. Being may, I 
suggest, be significantly thought of as an ontological continuum that is 
infinitely structurable. As a continuuum, it is itself unstructured; no 
structuring, however complex, can exhaust its possibility of further 
structuring. In view of this fact, an ontological continuum is pure poten-
tiality, the realm of infinite and unlimited possibility. (Yet, although it is, or 
has, no structure of its own, it is such that once it is structured in any way, it 
is no longer susceptible to certain other forms of structuring; although it is 
open to further structuring in fonns compatible with the structure received. 
There is, so to speak, an infinite number and variety of possible worlds, and 
each one has a ground plan permitting infinite elaboration compatible with 
it, but never constituting a completed structure of Being.) All "worlds," i.e., 
all existence is essentially incomplete. 
But if we try to think of Being as an ontological continuum, we meet an 
impasse. For a continuum is a concept, abstract and general. But Being 
cannot b~, or be understood, as an abstraction or even in terms of a 
transcendent generality. As pure potentiality it cannot be, since what is 
must be actual as well as potential. Or, in other words, Being exists only as 
structured, only as a possible world actualized. Since as a continuum itd 
not structure itself, nor as pure potentiality actualize itself, Bein mu t 
thought of as including the discrete, the pure actual, or the c ntin nt t is-
the "something" rather than the "nothing" of tran cendent 
which is infinite and unlimited potentiality. (If we think of B in n , a 
monistic unity, then it actualizes itself from the nee ity of its wn n tu 
and we commit ourselves to all the difficultie of a dogmatic r ti 
I tend to think of Being as including, or revealin two op,ooi!iea 
plemen.tary aspects: the continuum and the di er t , th t nti 
actual Being is only in the existent, but i not exh u t d i 
admit the individual as at once revelatory and con tituent 
Jt is individuals. in actuality as discrete and un pe t bl 
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effect the structuring of the con ti nu um f B • . 
individuals as merely discrete is to think in ote emg.f Bl_ut_ ~o think of the 
h . rms o a 1m1tmg concept and ence as set over against the ontolooical reali"ty f. B . B . . . 
• . c- o emg. ut an md1v1dual 
as not a mere abstraction· it exists and it ,·. and · · ti" • • . . , ~, 1n ex1s ng 1t constitutes a 
pa~cular struc~n~g of the continuum of the Being which transcends, but 
which also reahzes itself in existence. The existence of individuals and the 
existence of a world are inseparable realities .. 
If we think of individuals in terms of their discreteness and actuality, as 
the essential co~plement to the continuousness and potentiality of Being., 
they could not exist or have being as abstract generalities. Every individual 
exists as itself and no other, yet has its being in a world in which its own 
being is dependent upon the being of othe·r individuals, through their 
common and correlative potentialities. As we may imagine a material body 
as "occupying" exclusively its own spatial locus and in its own extensiveness 
continuous with the limited extension of other bodies, so we may think 
metaphorically of each individual as embracing in its being its own 
distinctive and limited potentialities which it alone can actualize, but which, 
as limited, are limitations of the unlimited potentiality of Being. Metaphori-
cally we may think of the "coming into being" of an individual as at once the 
coming into being of other individuals and the coming into being of the world 
that, as a particular mode of structuring of the ontological continuum., 
manifests, in its own limitations and incompleteness, the conditions to 
which all actuality is subject 
All of this is ontological speculation and leaves untouched the epistemo-
logical problem of the relation of thought to Being. Let me add only this: as 
individuals, we exist within a world existentially structured by our existence 
as the individuals having our own distinctive potentialities. Each of us. as 
actual, actualizes his own potentialities, subject to conditions imposed by 
acts of others. In actualizing his own potentialities, each individual is al o 
structuring. or restructuring., the world he shares with others. In think.in . h 
is, in a d-istinctive and indirect way; at once "realizing" himself nd 
actualizing potentialities of his human world, but within specific limit and 
incompletely. 
